SECOND LETTER ON PARTIES Addressed to the people of the State of New-York. March 11, 1795
IN my first letter I considered the position often advanced in favor of parties, as far as it was founded on historical examples: In this examination, I have only stated certain general principles, with such slight allusions to circumstances and facts as were thought necessary to illustrate those principles. The compass allowed by the present mode of publication would hardly admit of minute details. I can at present only indulge in free and general sketches.
Pursuing the plan proposed in my former address, I shall proceed to consider the position, as it rests upon the idea of a tendency in men to corruption and abuse of power, and the supposed efficacy of party-spirit to impede the progress, or to correct the evil.
In reasoning about the nature of man, we easily fall into the error or regarding that which often occurs as necessarily existing. We are governed by the number and apparent uniformity of examples, without examining the situation, circumstances and external motives, which many have contributed to produce them. Man, on coming into the world, comes into a pre-established system: he finds himself subject of innumerable relations, which thicken and multiply as he matures: they involve him in their mechanism, mould and modify his principles, and form his character. When he advances from merely social into the political state, he feels stronger necessities and relations still more complex: in this process his habits (a great branch of his character) are forming, varying, adjusting, confirming if he is elevated to superior rank or power, a new system instantly arises to guide, impel, embarrass or restrain him. In tracing the nature of man through his practical course therefore, we have to penetrate a medium obscure and confused, always changing its colors and exhibiting deceptive forms. Reflections like these should caution us against concluding absolutely respecting the natural principles and necessary tendencies of men, from the inumerable examples of crimes and corruption which blacken the page of history.
The true enquiry is, what are the nature, the principles, the defects of the system in which he acts? Is nature to be reproached with the vices of a despotic prince, nurtured in the lap of unbounded power, his early passion corrupted and inflamed to wanton indulgence by artificial incentives? Is nature responsible for acts of cruelty and tyranny in a government, which nothing but severity and terror can maintain in existence? Surely not–it is the miserable defect of the system. I am aware that examples of eminent virtue on the throne of despotism will be objected; but I reason from the general course of things–rare exceptions illustrate general principles–I am not to account for a few occasional, transient, light spots on the dark picture–besides I distrust in some degree the virtues of Antoninus and Titus and Trajan. The vices of princes are early exaggerated; their virtues often are.–In painting a virtuous character in the midst of a degenerate age, every historian becomes a flatterer. The effect of contrast is deceitful; among the group of monsters that stalk along the theatre, a mild and gentle figure appears an angel of light.
The tendency of corrupt and vicious systems is not only to invite, it is also to compel men to practice evil. Government in many cases is nothing more than just and artful accommodation of bad measures with bad principles. In the British government, when a minister comes into office, he finds himself in {{}{{{}}}, the general construction, motions, tendencies which are already established: were he to check these general motions and tendencies, were he to attempt to infuse into the machine new principles of organization; in the shock both he and the machine would sink together: his natural policy must be to guide it along the current, encounter the enemies that oppose, and avoid the rocks that lie hid;–and, to prevent internal jarring and the consequent decay of the structure, apply with a prudent hand the oil of expedients.
It is a common remark, that the most decided & enthusiastic advocate of liberty when in this strange fluctuation of the British government, he succeeds to the head of the administration, suffers a derelection of his principles and becomes an apostate; many wonder at the change–more stigmatize the man, and are ready to conclude that his former professions and zeal were those of an artful hypocrite;–the conclusion is perhaps too hasty and uncandid: there is a species of moral necessity attending his actual situation which should be brought into the account. To stem the torrent of corruption, to reform and infuse new principles of vigor into an old establishment, is reserved for geniuses of an uncommon stamp. The late Earl of Chathuam stands almost alone in ministerial history; he had the maganimity to attempt, and abilities to accomplish the great work; but what was the first measure he employed? Dissolving parties.
I am far from contending that man does not naturally love power and pre-eminence; but does he love it because it affords him an opportunity of gratifying bad principles and passions, or because it brings him positive and personal enjoyments? I hope the latter–then let us candidly conclude, that tho’ man loves power, he loves his interest better; bad principles, and passions themselves are superinduced by his situation. Shew me great power without constitutional restraint, and I will shew you habitual tyranny; place the same subjects within the sphere of a well adjusted democratic institution, and you will see an even and steady tendency to the public good. But an objection arises.–does not the necessity of restraint imply a vicious propensity? No–the propensity itself is a part of the system–the principles of the political enters into the composition of the human constitution: and our education under the influence of government and laws, is but a curious process of assimilation. What! Is man in a perpetual state of violence? Is ambition continually engaged in a painful struggle with the bars and setters that encompass it? At this rate the enjoyment of a limited and well defined power would be constant source of disquiet and misery.
In treating of the influence of the government upon the habits of the rulers, a distinction is noticeable which ought in justice to be allowed. In certain pure and absolute monarchies, the habits of the prince borrow somewhat less from the nature of government; every thing depending on his sovereign will, he often naturally follows his original impulses, without any direct referrence to external motives; in such governments therefore, it happens that the regal catalogue appears somewhat diversified; and there is a chance that what is called a good king, that is a king of comparative lenity and virtue may arise under the worst of circumstances; this is perhaps an advantage denied certain Gothic despotisms, where the power of the prince is limited, but, in an undefined manner; and where the obscure restraints only serve to enrage his ambition.
It will be seen, that I place great, nay almost entire reliance on the nature and form of the constitution. However it may once have been a question, I believe few, at this day, are inclined to dispute the principles that politics is a science.
The celebrated poet whose artful logic and enchanting numbers have bewildered many a reader, had he foreseen how easily he would have been misunderstood, when speaking of systems of government, he declared that—
‘That which is best administered is best’ would probably have explained himself, or expunged the passage; but he had before his eyes innumerable forms of both ancient and modern, none of which contained that great principle, which alone could ensure a virtuous administration; the principle of responsibility.
An author of high authority in political science has said, “that force of laws and of particular forms of government is so great, and so little dependence have they on the humours and tempers of men, that consequences almost as general and certain may sometimes be deduced from them; as any which the mathematical sciences afford us.”
A constitution organized upon original and tried principles, and containing the property of regular certain and constant responsibility, not only to check the occasional errors of the ruling power, but to form its habits, direct its views, and multiply the motives of patriotism. The constitution of our own country is certainly such an one, and the only one that has ever existed in the world: the conclusion therefore that a form tho above reflections and allusions is, that in this country, whatever irregular propensities may exist in the man, the frame and spirit of the constitutional laws have a direct and steady tendency to secure against the positive depravity of the citizen.
But is there still some radical defect, some corrupt principle in human nature to which no yet discovered constitution or remedy can reach? Let us still trust to the {{{{{}}{{{{{}-which time and knowledge may bring–let us reflect with pride and pleasure, that having already laid a broad and solid basis, we have now only to proceed in finishing and refining the noble superstructure. Doubt not that the improvements in political science will be carried so far that the restraints and checks of the constitution will operate like irresistible but silent attractions.
The idea, that parties are necessary to the balance of government, is founded on the supposition of a pre-established power not responsible to the people; it may be plausible in relation to mixed government, in which the revolutions and fluctuations, occasioned by the efficacy of faction, sometimes throw new principles of virtue or vigor into the enormous and corrupted mass of the monarchy; but the idea itself of a balance is hardly admissible in governments purely free; it is an illegitimate doctrine, founded not on scientific principles, but on a species of historical computation, in which all sorts of example are let into accumulate the sum. So numerous are the instances in history of the sufferings struggles and attainments of liberty, that we easily imbibe a habitual persuasion, that it is all an acquisition won from ancient tyranny; and that therefore liberty must always be a rival and a combatant and must maintain her conquests, by establishing a constitutional balance against the weight and strength of her enemy. In England, liberty is called a birth-right, an inheritance, a patrimony; they shew you their title deeds–but they talk not of the right of man; they dream no of a charter from God.
But if the establishment of party spirit can be considered as a remedy or check to the depravity of human nature, it is a dangerous remedy only to be resorted to when the efficacy of the constitution fails: Like self-created political societies; it may be salutary in difficult and desperate emergencies; but it is baneful in the bosom of a well regulated commonwealth; necessity may justify the policy as necessity justified the ancient Britons, in calling over an armed and ambitious neighbour to protect them from the invasions of their old and natural enemy: but in all cases it indicates and perpetuates the imbicility of the system. I fend the subject grows, as I advance; I must refer to future communications the prosecution of the interesting discussion. CONSTANTIUS
*SOURCE:
Go to Third Letter on parties, Constantius, March 12, 1795
© Gunston Nutbush Hall 2021, Reprinted and Republished for the internet by Gunston Nutbush Hall, Editor & Publisher, Watchmen Gazette
